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lN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
S1'ATE OF UTAH, by and through
its Road Commission,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.
LLOYD STANGER and EDNA
OLSON STANGER, his wife,
Defendants and Appellants.

Case
No. 11028

BRIEF OF RESP'O,NDENT
NATURE OF THE CASE
This is a higlnvay condenmation case. The issues on
appeal relate to whether or not the jury received proper
instructions concerning severance damages.
DISPOSITION IN LOvVER COURT
The parties stipulated to the value of the land taken.
The only issue given to the jury was what amount, if
nny, should defendants receive as severance damage.
The jury found that defendants' remaining land was
not damaged. The Court signed a judgment on that
verdict, and denied defendants' Motion for New Trial.
1

RE!LIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The jury verdict should be affirmed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondent agrees with the Statement of Facts as
set forth by appellants, except it wishes to have it fully
noted that the street grade in front of appellants' property was not disturbed and the taking as evidenced by
plaintiff's Exhibit "A" was in front of an unimproved
portion of appellant's property which, in fact, was done
for the benefit of appellants. Had this property not been
taken and paid for by the state, presuniably appellants
would have been required to take their own property
and construct what is in effect a frontage access road
to the highway system.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
IN EMINENT DOMAIN PROCEEDINGS, DAMAGES
CAN OCCUR TO PROPERTY WHICH ARE COMPENSABLE AND NONCOMPENSABLE. IN THIS
CASE THERE WERE NO DAMAGES OF EITHER
KIND.

Throughout the trial of this case, the Trial Judge
correctly infonned the jury of situations where landowners could not recover damages to remaining properties in Eminent Domain proceedings because damage
to the remainder was consequential and noncompensable
(Tr. 41-44; 45-46; 63-6-1-; 70; 81-82; 9±). 1'he Trial .T udge
was clearly correct in his statcnwnts to the jury regarding severance damages, both in comments during trial
2

and in Instruction No. 7, requiring that these damages
not be entirely due to the project's presence in the general area; that the severance damages be connected with
and caused by the severance of the defendants' land. It
is the law that in Eminent Domain cases there may be
noncompensable damages resulting to landowners. It is
the jury's duty to separate noncompensable damages
from compensable damages and allow only the constitutional, "just compensation" to the condemnee. As pointed
out in Springville Banking Company v. Burton, 10 U. 2d
100, 349 P. 2d 157 (1960), there may be noncompensable
damages upon the exercise of Eminent Domain, especially where there is no taking, or a tiny taking as in
this case, 0.22 of an acre.
In Utah Road Commission v. Hansen, 14 U. 2d 305,
383 P. 2d 917 ( 1963), the Court stated the general rule
that the severance damage the property owner was entitled to was the "difference in the value of the remaining
tract before and after the taking." The Court held that
it is not the burdensome obligation of the state to pay
fair value of the property taken and also have to pay
a resulting damage to the remainder because of a noncornpensable item of damages such as the cost of removal
of personal property.
In this case it was ultimately proper for the Trial
Court to instruct the jury that it is possible for the same
piece of land to suffer both compensable and noncompensable damages. The problem of separation was properly
left to the jury, (Tr. 42.) There are various limitations
11pon compensation for depreciation in value of the re3

maining or abutting land of a road project that are
generally recognized. One main limitation is pointed out
in the case of State v. District, Fonrth Jitdicial District,
94 U. 384, 78 P. 2d 502 (1937) at Page 510:

"We believe that a line of demarcation should be

drawn at the point of 'actionable damage.' The
<Constitution clearly does not require compensation for damag·es not recognized as actionable at
common law but more a damaging of property 'to
the actionable degree' the Constitution makers
intended the landowner to have just compensation
equally with the landowner whose property was
physically taken."
It is submitted that the Utah Constitution and U.C.A.
78-34-10 ( 3) do not change the basic requirement of certainty of damages, but merely entitles the landowner
whose property was not physically taken to the same
damages that would he certain to be suffered by the
landowner whose property was taken. The Court should
not accord to propert~v owners whose property is not
taken more rights to damages than a property mYner
·whose property is taken would have. Both types of situations should be treated equally, and if a property owner
·whose property is not taken suffers a consPquential
damage which is noncornpensable then the property
owner \vho is lucky enough to have a sliver, 0.22 acr('
in the case at bar, of his property taken by the state
should not be allowed to recover more damag·es than the
property owner whose property is not taken. Uncertain
consequential, nonproximate damages should not be
allowed in either rasP.
It is basic that

damag(~S
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must he certain and ascer-

tainable. Speculative mere possibility of harm is to be
exc1uded from compensation.
A furher important restriction upon recovery for
depreciated value due to proximity of the project is the
rule that the landowner must bear, without compensation
such depreciation that results from inconvenience and
other type damage common to the whole neighborhood.
If such were not the law of the land, the burden of
administration and cost upon the condemning authority
would be prohibitive. Further, the burden of ascertaining damages and resulting benefits incurred by every
individual in the neighborhood would be an impossible
undertaking for the Courts, the expert witnesses and
the juries. Each would have to become licensed clairvoyants.
All Courts have expressed reluctance to open the
door to the flood of claims which would be common to
everyone in the community. There is consistent tendency
to allow redress only for those who have suffered real
and substantial loss different than others in the area
by reason of the public improvement. As stated at 170

ALR 722:
" ... just compensation does not include diminution in the value of the remainder caused by the
acquisition and use of adjoining lands of others
for the same undertaking. This general rule is
supported by all the cases in which it appeared
possible to separate the damages caused to the
remainder of the O\vner 's tract by the use of the
parcel taken from the damages caused by the
similar use of adjoining land belonging to the
other owners."
5

And the same reasoning, that noncompensable damages should be separated where possible, is upheld by
C'alifornia in Rose v. Sta.te, 19 Cal. 2d 713, 123 P. 2d 505
( 1942) pp. 520-521 :
"In states such as Californi'a where the recovery
of damages depends upon the infringement of
some right which the owner of the land possesses
in connection with his property decisions have
clearly indicated that, although the measiJre of
damages is generally the diminution in market
value, the evidence relied upon t.o establi.sh such
dimitwution must be based upon the depreciation
flowing from the actionable injury which is the
basis for the right to recover damages. Thus, in
People v. Gianni, 130 Cal. App. 584, 20 P. 2d 87,
a small portion of land was taken for public highway purposes. It was contended on behalf of the
landowner that because a small portion of land
had been taken and because he was entitled to
recovery for that injury, the damages to his remaining land should be based upon the total depreciation in the value of his remaining property
even though that depreciation was caused primarily by an admittedly noncompensable element of
dam'age, that is, diversion of traffic. rrhe court
said, however that while diminution in market
value was ordinarily the test of damage to real
property, the, damages must be limited to those
which accrue by reason (italics theirs) of the legal
injury for which compensation was due. In a
similar case, it was held that evidence as to the
damage caused by a diversion of traffic by reason
of highway construction was properly stricken
from the record because the diminution in valne
resulting therefrom was not caused by any injury
for which the landowner was entitled to recovPr
damages. City of Stockton v. Marengo, 137 Cal.
App. 760 764, 31 P. 2d 4G7. It will 7Je noted tlwt

this result was reached in California· where a taking of property was involved. (Emphasis added.)

"A similar conclusion must also be reached where
damage alone is involved. Many courts have indicated that the diminution of value in such cases
cannot be based upon elements of damage for
which the landowner is not entitled to recover.
Greer v. City of Texarkana, 201 Ark. 1041, 147
S.\V. 2d 1004; City of Chicago v. Spoor, 190 Ill.
340, 60 N.E. 540; Cafden Interstate Ry. Co. v.
Smiley, 84 S.W. 523 27 Ky. Law Rep. 134; Harrison v. Louisiana Highway Comm., 191 La. 839,
186 So. 354. ''
In the railroad nuisance case of Stockdale, et al v.
Rio Grande Western Ry. Co., et al, 77 P. 849, 28 Utah
201 (1904), page 853, this Court stated:
"We do not wish to be understood as holding that
every inconvenience that an individual may be
subject to in the possession and enjoyment of his
property because of the construction and operation of a railroad or other public utility in the
vicinity of his premises entitles him to damages
or injunctive relief. The rule is well settled that
no reoovery can be had for losses and inconveniences which are suffered in common with the
general public." (Emphasis ad~ed)
The same reasoning is well explained at 22ALR148:
"In Austin v. Augusta Terminal R. Co., 108 G.
671 L.R.A. 755, 34 S.E. 852 (1899), it was held
that,
". . . in the clause of the Georgia Constitution
providing that 'private property shall not be
taken or damaged for public purposes without
just or adequate compensation being first paid,
tlie word damaged is used in its usual sense as
7

a law term and does not ehange the substantiw
law of damages or create a cause of action wherein
none previously existed; nor does it abrogate tlw
principal expressed in the phrase "damnum
abseque injuri'a.' ... Thereafter what is damage
by one is damage by all; and, like'wise, what is
damn um absque injuria to one is so to all. If
one landowner diminishes the market value of his
neighbor's house by cutting off light and air
therefrom, he is not required to make good th<~
depreciation. He had a right to build a ~wall, and
legally speaking, he has not damaged his neighbor. So, too, if a city should erect a public building, or a railroad put up a warehouse, and cut off
the same easement of light and air, neither would
they be liable, for they had the same right to build,
and neither had they damaged the adjoining lot
owner."
In Statf Higlw:ay Commission v. Siln1, 71 N.1\I.
350, 378 P. 2d 595 (1962), the old highway ~was left in
place, in effect as a frontage road and barricade at a
point beyond Silva's property. The Court citing other
jurisdictions held that if there remains reasonable access
to the main highway system; and, though remaining
access may be more circuitous, his injury is the same in
kind even though greater in degree, as that suffered hy
the geneml public and is damnum absque injuria. That
is the precise circumstance in the case at bar.

Under the Utah Constitution, a person whose pro1ierty has sitffercd spcc:frzl damage different in any substantive degree than others for the public use has the
same rights arnl is given the rernedie:,; for the protection
nf his propc>rty from the injury as woulrl hc accorclecl him
if his property was adnally tnkeu by a pri\'atc party, lint
8

damage must be actionable, direct and substantial.
rrhis notion is set forth in Springville Banking Company
v. Burton, 10 Utah 2d 100, 349 P. 2d 157 (1960), where
an abutting landowner was not allowed to recover for
damages bec:ause of traffic dividing islands
~uch

Appellants here would have us believe that because
this Court defined the word "damages" in Board of
Ed11cafion v. Croft, 13 Utah 2d 310, 373 P. 2d 697 (1962),
under 78-34-10(3), it meant to say that noncompensable
damages could never co-exist with severance damages.
rrh:at merely because a landowner is fortunate enough
to have a sliver of his parcel of land physically taken by
the condemning authority, that he is entitled to collect
damages that would be noncompensable to all other landmvners suffering a similar reduction in value though
there ·was no physical taking. But the very fact that this
Court disallmved $1,000.00 consequential damages given
by the jury in its special verdict in Croft, stating that
such damages were included in the award for severance
damages, demonstrates that the Court recognized that
it is logieal that the same piece of land may suffer both
reeoverable and nonrecoverable damages. In the Croft
('ase, ·when a part of the total parcel was taken, as in
this case, nrnl the consequential damages were properly
separated by the jury it w·as held that the landwner could
not recover for consequential damages though a part of
l1is land >Vas actually taken.

It would be nrnk discrimination to allow one landowner to rceover damagPs that another could not recover,
.inst lwcause he \Yas lucky Pnough to have a small part

of his land actually taken. Such allowance would be conrary to the intent manifested by the Constitution. Interrogatory number 3 of the special verdict "how much, if
any, of the above are noncompensatory incidental damages,'' was properly put to the jury. Of course, the
answer was zero, beeause the verdict of the jury was
that the evidence did not support any loss in value due
to the severance of the land taken (Instruction No. S),
compensable or otherwise.
If appellants' argument is accepted, there would
not only be unjust discrimination and unjust compensation paid, contrary to all constitutional concepts, but
public authorities would be required to pay more damages than a private infringing owner would be required
to pay under the circumstance of a similar nature. That
is, the private owner would not be liable for damages
eonsequential in n'ature, whereas the tax paying public
would be required to pay for any and all ordinarily noncompensa ble damages.
As has been pointed out, the jury verdict form
asked for "all loss in value" because of the severance of
the land and the construction of the project. Instruction number 9 stated that references to the word "damages" had reference to "just compensation." Instruction number 10 states that; " . . . if the public takes
lands directly involved in a project and uses it to bring
about construction of a nature that destroys value, then
severance damages may well be present." Instruction
number 14 on just compensation states: "In other words,
all of the factors and t>l<'ments afft>cting value of prop10

erty which well-informed buyers and sellers would consider can be considered by you in arriving at your decision." (Emphasis added) It should be noted that the
State's expert witness, Memory H. Cain, Jr., was asked
questions concerning damage to the remainder, such as
privacy, cracks, access and distance to the fill, (Tr. 68G9.) He also explained why he felt there had been no
damage (Tr. GS-70) and it was the jury's right to believe
him. The Trial Judge asked counsel for suggestions to
relate to the jury on the difference between noncompensa tory and compensatory damages, (Tr. 98) and appellants ca11not now object to an improper or unclear distinguishment, if indeed there is auy confusion.
If such instructions are considered as a whole, as the
;jury was instructed along with testimony that there were
no severance damage at all (Tr. GS), it is submitted that
there is no confusion, and the issue of severance damages
was properly and fairly submitted to the jury.

Despite appellants' contentions, there is no basis
to assume that the reason Mr. Cain, the state's appraiser,
found no severance damage, was because he was using
the ( 'ourt 's definition of what constituted severance damage. Appraisers can and do differ widely in their opinions. Mr. Cain was asked in his opinion if there was
any severance damage. He answered no, and gave good
reasons wlw he felt there had been no damage. He felt
that there was better access, better privacy and the same
sno\v removal and garbage pick up. He also said that
some other liomt'S in the a r0a similar!)· situated had suffen'<l no (1amage eithN, (T'r. G8-78). The Comt had not
)·et mcntio110<l Slim Olse11 's case or the 8e Rancho ::\Iotel.
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If all of the instructions and testimony be taken as
a whole, bearing in mind the fact that appellants had
the burden of proof, it is logical, proper and simple to
see that the jury believed the state and not the landowner. There is no basis to assume that the verdict form
is incorrect or confusing. Interrogatory number 1 asked
for the loss in value, not the confusing word "damage",
in the remaining land and iniprD?.:f1nents (emphasis
a<lded) because of the severance "and the construction
of the project as designed." Taken with the other two
interrogatories asking for a separation of "severance
damages'' and 11011compensatory incidental damages, not
the confusing word "consequential," any reasonable person would at once understand that the first interrogatory
asked for all damages caused by the entire project, if
any there was. The form is as correct and clear as is
the verdict of the jury. The verdict should be upheld to do othenvise would be to invade the province of the
JUry.
POINT II.
THE DOCTRINE OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY IS
APPLICABLE IN EMINENT DOMAIN CASES IN
THAT THERE IS NO CONSENT TO BE SUED FOR
NONCOMPENSABLE DAMAGES.

The Trial ·Court was most certainly not confm;ed
concerning the application of the Doctrine of Sovereign
Immunit:·. _At no point in the trial was the doctrine advocated or instrnctions given 011 it. Furthermore the verdict
form makes no referenee to the doctrine. Reference
by appellants to the doctrine is a men' shallow to confmw
the issues.

12

Inferences by appellants taken to mean that the
Trial Court improperly applied the Symes case and
that sovereign immunity controlled this case is not borne
out by the Court's comments to the jury or instructions
to the jury. The Judge's comment that the mere fact that
appellants vvere in Court does not expand the scope
of severance damages, (Tr. 12), was made in chambers
and never reached the jury's ears. Never was the appellants' right to be in Court or their rights to damages
suffered, if any, challenged. All of the Court's comments
Symes, Fairclough and Hansen were merely directed as
an aid in assessing the type and amount of damages, if
any.
Appellants cite St.a.te Road Commission v. Fourth
District Court, 9-1 Utah 384, 78 P. 2d 502 (1937), as
overturning the doctrine of sovereign immunity when
there is no physical land taking. This Court in that case
explained that the consent of the state to be sued is not
ordinarily implied and that "the line of demarcation
should be drawn at the point of 'actionable damage,'
page 510.
All of the eases cited by appellants sho\v that the
soYereign, under the constitution and the statute, has
only consented to be sued in cases where there are damages actionable under common law definitions of damages
and just compensation. There can be no implied consent
to suit for damages that are unjust or noncompensable.
ln the ease of Dooly Block v. Salt Lake Rapid Transit
Co., 9 Utah 31, 33 P. 229 (1893), this Court recognized
that the abutting propPrty owner could recover for an

13

established right of easement because "he had rights not
Hhared by the public at large, special and peculiar to himself." The Court allowed recovery for damages that were
special and unique and distinguislta ble from those sustained by other properties in the neighborhood, the logical inference being that the soYereign only consents to be
sued for special, actionable damages. Therefore, it can't
be contended that the last sentence of Instruction number
7 conccrui11g noncompe11sahle damages that are not special or unique ·was prejudicial.
The attempted definition of "highway purposes" in
U.C.A. 27-12-96 cited by the appellants at Page 28 of
their brief, implies sovereign consent to be sued in all
eases where rights of access, air, light and view are
incidentally interferred ·with. Such an interpretation
would loose a flood gate of suits from landowners and
abutters who would be looking for treasure trove and
windfalls. The case of Ut.ah Road Commission v. Hwnsen,
14 Utah 2d 305, 383 P. 2d 917 (1963), recognizes the public necessity of reasonable limitations on damages in condemnation proceedings. The Court recognized an easement as a property right that would be compensable only
if it were suustantia.lly i11terferred ·with, or if the owner
were not left with some reason.able means of access to
the highways as instruction number 10 states. This view
is set forth at '.26 Am. Jur., section 200, Eminent
Domain:
"Indeed, it has been held that a substantial or
material impairment of or interference with an
abutting owner's right of reasonable access, by
the public authoritieH, is a taking of his property,
even though he iH not totally deprived of all
14

access. But the right of the abutting property
owner is subject to the rights of the public to use
the street for highway purposes. Inasmuch as the
rights of the abutter are subordinate to the rights
of the public, there is no taking of private property where streets are used and i1nproved for the
purpose of a highway." (Emphasis added)
Also 26 Am. JHr. 242:
"It is not always easy to determine what constitute·s special or peculiar damage for which the
private owner may maintain an action for the
vacation or discontinuance of a street or highway.
No general rule has been laid down which can
readily be applied to every case. It is not enough
that the vacation results merely in some inconvenience to his access, or compels a more circuitous route of access, or a diversion of travel
in front of the premises, and ·a consequent diminution of value. To sustain the right of a claimant
to compensation, it must appear that the loss
results from the depreciation in value of his land
because of the change in the street, and his loss
must he direct and proximate, and so obvious
and substantial a.s to admit calculation."
The jury in this case could and did find that there
were no damages of any kind to the i·emaining tract of
land. The jury found that appellants were left with
reasonable acct>ss, light, air, and view as was testified
to at the trial by Mr. Cain. The verdict is clear that the
jury found no damages, compensable or othenvise, as it
is exceedingly apparent they believed the testimony of
the state - not the landowner.
Jury Instructions number 7, 10 and 1-1 properly
presented the la1v of Utah concerning consequential dam1;)

ages. I nstrurtion nurnhPr 7 concerned the reduction in
value as severance darnage, qualifiPd by the fact that
damages dut~ to project's presence in the general area
must be related to the taking.
This view is upheld by the Ftah cases cited, especially the Fourth District case r0qniring "actionable
damages," and also i11 26 Am. Jur., section 201 "Under Constitutional Provisions Req11iring Compens.aition
Where Propery Is Damaged."
"In some jurisdictions it appears to be the rule
that the change in the constitution, providing for
cornpensation where private property is damaged
for a public use, effected no material change in tlw
right of abutting owners to compensation; then•
must be a taking of property after the amendment, the same as before (common law physical
taking)
" ... it would seem that the abutter is entitld to
compensation whenever the public use inflicts
damage on adjoining property. The only practical test is whether or not the market value (the
before and after rule) of the property is diminished by the use, such diminution in value being
different from that s1.tff erc,d by the comm1111ity at
large; there can be no olloivance for personal inconvenience and discomfort, n°or is a mere sc11tiniental disturbance an element of injury for 1rhich
recovery nwy be had." (Emphasis added)
In Instnwtion nnrnlwr 1-l: the jury was instructed
that just conqwmmtion ineluded, " ... all of the factors
and elPments affrctiug value of property which Wt~ll
informed hu:n·rs and sellers would consider," including
its topography. Sun·ly this is not a misuse of the doc-

trine of sovereign immunity. On the contrary, the jury
was instructed to compensate the respondents for all of
the compensable elements of damages that the sovereign
had consented to. Again, the jury could have found damages to the severed tract, had they thought it damaged,
though noncompensable. They found none, which is really
the essence of this case.
It does not require extensive analysis to understand
that if this Court were to hold that the sovereign had
eo11sc11ted to be sued for all damages, even those that are
not actionable, special, proximate or direct, it would not
only be against precedent but ridiculously costly to the
sovereign and other condemning authorities.

CONCLUSION
The jury considered all of the testimony. They
tested the credibility of the witnesses with a view of the
property. They received clear and intelligent instructions and returned a verdict of no money damage to the
1·<·mai11der compensable or otherwise. Full academic
discussions could ha\·c heen justified if the jury had
fournl money damages, but not compensable under the
Court's instructions. In this case, the properly impan(•led and \vell-informed jury should be sustained.
Respectfully submitted,
George E. Bridwell
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